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INTERNATIONAL DECISIONS
opposed by the other." Judges Higgins and Kooijmans argued that the Court, after
observing that the parties had not raised this point,22 should have addressed proprio motu
whether a dispute exists relating to the line beyond Point G proposed by Cameroon.
Both pointed to the absence of negotiations between the parties on that particular
stretch of the maritime boundary. Judge Higgins found support for her conclusion that
there is no dispute relating to the maritime boundary beyond Point Gin the way Camer-
oon formulated the document instituting proceedings. In its Application, Cameroon
asked for a delimitation of the maritime boundary "[i]n order to prevent any dispute
arising."2 Judge Kooijmans pointed out that Cameroon had not formulated a specific
claim on that stretch of the maritime boundary until submitting the Memorial, so that
at the date of the filing of the Application, there was no claim of Cameroon that was
"positively opposed" by Nigeria.24
It is safe to assume that counsel for Nigeria chose not to argue this point precisely to
avoid the appearance of a dispute. Because of this litigation strategy, and because the
Court declined to address the issue proprio motu despite its observation that "Nigeria is
entitled not to advance arguments that it considers are for the merits at the present
stage of the proceedings, ' 25 Nigeria's objection was rejected by a majority of the judges.
The majority was satisfied that there is a dispute on the basis that Cameroon and Nigeria
had not been able to agree on the continuation of the negotiations on the maritime
boundary beyond Point G, when, in any event, they had set out to negotiate the whole of
the maritime boundary.26 The majority's holding will cause counsel in future similar
cases to review their litigation strategy very carefully.
PETER H. F. BEKKER
McDermott, Will & Emery, New York
European Communities restrictions on imports of beef treated with hormones-nontaiff trade
bariers-control offood additives-scientific basis for restrictions-WTO dispute settlement
mechanisms-scope of review
EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES-MEASURES CONCERNING MEAT AND MEAT PRODUCTS. WTO
Doc. WT/DS26/AB/R & WT/DS48/AB/R_
World Trade Organization Appellate Body, January 16, 1998.
This report of the Appellate Body of the World Trade Organization (WTO) is both
the most recent development in a long-running trade battle between the United States
and the European Communities and the first dispute to be addressed under a new
Uruguay Round agreement concerning food safety measures.
Several directives promulgated under the authority of the European Communities
(EC or Communities) prohibit the sale of meat and meat products, including foodstuffs
imported into the Communities, derived from cattle treated for growth promotion pur-
poses with any of three synthetic (trenbolone acetate, zeranol, and melengestrol acetate)
or three natural hormones (oestradiol-17/6, progesterone, and testosterone). For more
than a decade, the United States, where use of the same hormones is permitted for
these purposes, has objected to the EC hormone ban as a nontariff barrier to trade
A Slip op., para. 87.
"Id., para. 110.
- Id., para. 16 (emphasis added).
Slip op., Separate Opinion ofJudge Kooijmans, para. 10.
'Slip op., para. 93.
"' Id., para. 110.
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unsupported by scientific evidence.' At stake is an export market of approximately $250
million per year.
The negotiation of a new Agreement on the Application of Sanitary and Phytosanitary
Measures (SPS Agreement) 2 in the Uruguay Round of Multilateral Trade Negotiations
under the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) was shaped largely against
the background of, and as a generic response to, the issues that emerged from the U.S.-
EC dispute over beef hormones. After the entry into force of that Agreement on January
1, 1995, the United States3 and Canada,4 in parallel dispute settlement panel proceedings,
successfully challenged the EC hormone ban. In response to the Communities' appeal,
the WTO Appellate Body upheld the results in both panels. However, the Appellate
Body modified the panels' reasoning in certain significant respects.
The Uruguay Round's SPS Agreement is significant for its attempt to discipline food
safety measures, such as the Communities' hormone ban, that are neither facially discrim-
inatory nor patently discriminatory as applied. The principal vehicle for accomplishing
this purpose is a scientific test, which marks the first time that scientific integrity has
been identified as an explicit component of the GATT/WTO multilateral regime of
rules.5 The Appellate Body's report consequently highlights many of the issues, both
explicit and implicit, raised by this new approach.
The SPS Agreement expresses a preference for multilaterally agreed, harmonized
standards,6 which in the area of human food safety are established primarily by the
Codex Alimentarius. After a lengthy and contentious debate, the Codex Commission
in 1995 approved the use of two of the synthetic hormones at issue in this dispute by
adopting maximum residue limitations (MRLs) for them, and concluded that no such
limits were necessary for the three hormones that occur naturally.8 On the relationship
between the EC ban and the newly established Codex standards, the WTO Appellate
Body reversed the panels' conclusion that the SPS Agreement requires that national
measures, such as the EC hormone ban, tightly "conform to" international standards,
such as Codex MRLs. The Appellate Body consequently relaxed the required nexus
' See U.S. Dep't of Agriculture, Foreign Agricultural Service, Chronology of the European Union's Hormone
Ban, June 26, 1996, available in LEXIS, News Library, Arcnews File.2 Apr. 15, 1994, Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex IA, in FINAL Acr EMNODYING
THE RESULTS OF THE URUGUAY ROUND OF MULTILATERAL TRADE NEGOTAMTONS, MARRAKESH, 15 APRIL 1994,
at 69 (1994) [hereinafter SPS Agreement].
sWTO Doc. WT/DS26/R/USA (Aug. 18,1997) (http://www.wto.org/wto/dispute/distab.htm) [hereinafter
U.S. Panel Report].
4 WTO Doc. WT/DS48/R/CAN (Aug. 18, 1997) (http://www.wto.org/wto/dispute/distab.htm).
s See generally David A. Wirth, The Role of Science in the Uruguay Round and NAFTA Trade Disciplines, 27 CORNELL
INT'L LJ. 818 (1994) (reprinted as United Nations Environment Programme, Environment and Trade Mono-
graph No. 8).6 SPS Agreement, supra note 2, Art. 3, paras. 1-3. The benefits of international standards from a trade point
of view are relatively obvious: producers in one country readily obtain market access to any other country
applying the same standards. There has been concern, however, that multilateral standards may reflect a least-
common-denominator consensus responsive to those countries that are the least aggressive in protecting public
health from food-related risks.
'The Codex Alimentarius Commission was created in 1962 as a joint undertaking of the UN Food and
Agriculture Organization (FAO) and the World Health Organization (WHO). Membership is open to all
FAQ and WHO member states and now numbers more than 130. The Commission has a dual function:
"protecting the health of the consumers and ensuring fair practices in the food trade." Statutes of the
Codex Alimentarius Commission, Art. 1, para. (a), reprinted in CODEX ALIMENTARIUS COMMISSION, PROCE-
DURAL MANUAL 4 (10th ed. 1997). To this end, the Commission is specifically charged with adopting advisory
multilateral "good practice" standards on such matters as the composition of food products, food additives,
labeling, food-processing techniques, and inspection of foodstuffs and processing facilities. As of 1993, the
Codex Commission had evaluated 187 pesticides, 523 food additives, and 57 food contaminants, and
established 3,019 maximum residue limitations for pesticides. See ROGER W. MILLER, THIS IS CODEX ALI.
MENTARIUS (1993).8
'This action was taken by recorded vote-itself unusual-that was also noteworthy for being quite close:
33 in favor, 29 against, with 7 abstentions. See Dep't of Agriculture, supra note 1; U.S. Panel Report, supra
note 3, para. 8.67.
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between international standards and national measures that are "based on" those inter-
national standards, as specified in the SPS Agreement.9
The SPS Agreement identifies the circumstances under which a WTO member may
adopt measures more stringent than international standards. As a first step in this
process, the SPS Agreement introduces the term "appropriate level of sanitary or
phytosanitary protection."' 0 This concept appears at its core to be a social value choice
based on national policy priorities. The Appellate Body nonetheless upheld the panels
in concluding, on the basis of the SPS Agreement's reference to the need for a
"scientific justification,"" that the choice of this public health objective is subject to
certain of the scientific disciplines of the SPS Agreement. 2 This is a critical juncture
in the Appellate Body's reasoning, as the Communities' chosen level of protection
was zero risk.
The Communities also challenged the panels' determination that the EC, as the
responding party maintaining the measure, was required to demonstrate its validity.
The Appellate Body reversed on this point, concluding instead that the burden was
on the challenging party to establish a prima facie case.' 3 Having determined that
the hormone ban was inconsistent with the continued availability, first, of the
natural hormones for therapeutic purposes in cattle and, second, of other drugs al-
lowed for use in pigs, the panels had concluded that these disparities in regulatory
approach indicated that the hormone ban amounted to discrimination or a disguised
restriction on trade. The Appellate Body reversed these conclusions of the panels
as well.' 4
Once a WTO member has determined that it desires a level of protection in excess
of that provided by multilateral standards, the measures chosen must be "based on" a
risk assessment." Significantly, the Appellate Body relaxed the panels' interpretation of
the requirement for a risk assessment, observing that the Agreement does not "require
a risk assessment to establish a minimum quantifiable magnitude of risk, nor do[es the
Agreement] exclude a pniori, from the scope of a risk assessment, factors which are not
"WTO Doc. WT/DS26/AB/R & WT/DS48/AB/R, paras. 157-68, & 253(g), (h) (Jan. 16, 1998) (http://
ww.wto.org/wto/dispute/distab.htm) [hereinafter Appellate Body Report].
" E.g., SPS Agreement, supra note 2, Art. 3, para. 3, Art. 5, paras. 3-6, & Annex B, para. 3(c). Noting that
"[m]any Members ... refer to this concept as the 'acceptable level of risk,' " paragraph 5 of Annex A defines
"[aippropriate level of sanitary or phytosanitary protection" as " [t]he level of protection deemed appropriate
by the Member establishing a sanitary or phytosanitary measure to protect human, animal or plant life or
health within its territory."
"The Agreement explains that
there is a scientific justification if, on the basis of an examination and evaluation of available scientific
information in conformity with the relevant provisions of this Agreement, a Member determines that the
relevant international standards, guidelines or recommendations are not sufficient to achieve its appro-
priate level of sanitary or phytosanitary protection.
SPS Agreement, supra note 2, Art. 3, para. 3 n.2.
:'Appellate Body Report, supra note 9, paras. 173-77 & 253(i).
'Id., paras. 97-109 & 253(a). This ruling may be particularly important for regulatory schemes, such as
those for food additives and human drugs in the United States, that require the manufacturer to demonstrate
safety rather than the Government to demonstrate harm.
"Id., paras. 210-46 & 253(m). In reaching this conclusion, the Appellate Body did, however, affirm the
panels' finding that these differences in level of protection were "unjustifiable" within the meaning of the
SPS Agreement. Id., para. 235.
' SPS Agreement, supra note 2, Art. 5, para. 1. Paragraph 4 of Annex A to the Agreement defines "risk
assessment" as follows:
The evaluation of the likelihood of entry, establishment or spread of a pest or disease within the territory
of an importing Member according to the sanitary or phytosanitary measures which might be applied,
and of the associated potential biological and economic consequences; or the evaluation of the potential
for adverse effects on human or animal health arising from the presence of additives, contaminants,
toxins or disease-causing organisms in food, beverages, or feedstuffs.
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susceptible of quantitative analysis by the empirical or experimental laboratory methods
commonly associated with the physical sciences.' 16 Similarly, the Appellate Body reversed
the panels' conclusion that the risk assessment must in fact have been taken into account
in framing the measure. 17 The "based on" test does, however, demand a rational substan-
tive relationship, subject to review by panels, between the risk assessment and the measure
adopted.18 The Appellate Body affirmed the panels' conclusion that the EC hormone
ban did not satisfy this requirement.
The Appellate Body, as had the panels, then proceeded to consider the scientific
validity of the evidence proffered by the Communities in support of the hormone ban.
Unlike much municipal administrative law, the SPS Agreement, as the Appellate Body
noted, contains no standard for review of expert determinations by administrative bodies
of WTO members. Notwithstanding the official U.S. contemporaneous interpretation
suggesting deference,' 9 cited by the Communities, the Appellate Body declined to iden-
tify any such standard of review for panels to apply.2 °
On the other hand, the Appellate Body's review of certain scientific evidence ana-
lyzed by the panels proved to be highly deferential to the panels. The Appellate Body
declined to reverse the panels' determinations unless those findings amounted to
"deliberate disregard of evidence or gross negligence amounting to bad faith, ' 21 or
"deliberate disregard or distortion of evidence."-22 In the end, the Appellate Body upheld
all the panels' findings with respect to scientific integrity, although it believed that
the panels had "sometimes misinterpreted" the evidence.2' This result concentrates
substantial, virtually unreviewable discretion on questions of science in the dispute
settlement panels.
Last, the Appellate Body rejected the proposition that the SPS Agreement should be
read against the background of a "precautionary principle," which counsels governmen-
tal authorities to err on the side of protection in formulating public policy in contexts
16 Appellate Body Report, supra note 9, para. 253(j). See also id., paras. 180-87. The Appellate Body noted:
In most cases, responsible and representative governments tend to base their legislative and administrative
measures on "mainstream" scientific opinion. In other cases, equally responsible and representative
governments may act in good faith on the basis of what, at a given time, may be a divergent opinion
coming from qualified and respected sources. By itself, this does not necessarily signal the absence of a
reasonable relationship between the SPS measure and the risk assessment, especially where the risk
involved is life-threatening in character and is perceived to constitute a clear and imminent threat to
public health and safety.
Id., para. 194.
17Id., paras. 180-91 & 253(k). This point is important because the "based on" standard, as well as the
other obligations in the Agreement, applies to measures put in place before the SPS Agreement's entry into
force. Id., paras. 126-30 & 253(d).
81Id., paras. 192-93 & 253(i).
9 Uruguay Round Agreements Act, Statement of Administrative Action, reprinted in H.R. Doc. No. 103-316,
at 656, 746 (1994), reprinted in 1994 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4040, 4105:
It is clear that the requirement in the [SPS] Agreement that measures be based on scientific principles
and not be maintained "without sufficient scientific evidence" would not authorize a dispute settlement
panel to substitute its scientificjudgment for that of the government maintaining the sanitary or phytosani-
tary measure. For example, by requiring that a measure be based on scientific principles (rather than,
for instance, requiring that a measure be based on the "best" science) and not to be maintained without
sufficient scientific evidence (rather than, for instance, requiring an examination of the "weight of the
evidence"), the [SPS] Agreement recognizes the fact that scientific certainty is rare and many scientific
determinations require ajudgment among differing scientific views. The [SPS] Agreement preserves the
ability of governments to make such judgments.
20Appellate Body Report, supra note 9, paras. 100-19 & 253(b).
21 Id., para. 138.
z Id., para. 139.
z Id., para. 253(e).
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characterized by conditions of scientific uncertainty. 2 Instead, observed the Appellate
Body, a version of the precautionary principle is embodied in the text of the SPS Agree-
ment itself, which specifies the relevant requirements.
Both U.S. cattle exporters25 and executive branch officials26 expressed dissatisfaction
with the EC decision to conduct further studies in response to the Appellate Body's
report." A subsequent arbitrator's report pursuant to the WTO's dispute settlement
procedures, however, declined to allow the Communities additional time to perform
such tests, on the theory that the SPS Agreement requires a scientific justification as of
the date of its entry into force.28 These subsequent developments may nonetheless reveal
a weakness in the SPS Agreement's fundamental reliance on science. Science is an
ongoing search for knowledge against a constantly shifting, evolving background that,
in controversial regulatory areas, by its very nature may well require operative decisions
at new frontiers. This report is unlikely definitively to resolve significant policy questions
about the efficacy from a trade point of view, and the legitimacy from a public health
perspective, of scientific tests employed in the adversarial, adjudicatory setting of dispute
settlement under a trade agreement.
DAVID A. WIrTH
Washington and Lee University School of Law*
Application of Fifth Amendment to U.S. Constitution in international context-fear of foreign
prosecution as ground for invoking privilege against self-incrimination-relevance of growing
international law enforcement cooperation-role of U.S. judiciary in foreign relations
UNITED STATES v. BALSYs. 118 S.Ct. 2218.
U.S. Supreme Court, June 25, 1998.
Resolving a long-open question, the U.S. Supreme Court held in this 7-2 decision
that a witness in a domestic proceeding may not invoke the constitutional privilege
against self-incrimination if the witness fears that the testimony may be used in a
prosecution outside the United States. Although grounded in domestic law, the three
opinions in Balsys reveal tension between the judiciary's traditional deference to the
political branches in foreign relations matters and its concern over the risk that individ-
uals subject to prosecution abroad will suffer deprivation of liberty because of that
deference.
Lithuanian native Aloyzas Balsys had immigrated in 1961 and become a U.S. resi-
dent alien. Decades later, the Office of Special Investigations (OSI), established
within the U.S. Department of Justice to effect the denaturalization or deportation
of suspected Nazi war criminals, began investigating whether Balsys, contrary to state-
ments on his immigration papers, had taken part in Nazi persecutions during World
I ld., paras. 120-25 & 253(c).
See Testimony of Dana R. Hauk, Chairman, International Markets Committee, National Cattlemen's Beef
Association, Review of the 1999 WTO Afultilateral Negotiations on Agricultural Trade-Europe: Hearing Before the
House Comm. on Agriculture, 105th Cong., 2d Sess. (Mar. 18, 1998), available in LEXIS, News Library,
Cumws File.
"' See Gregory Viscusi, U.S. Wants Quick End to Europe's Hormone Beef Ban, CoM. APPEAL, Mar. 7, 1998, at BIO,
available in LEXIS, News Library, Curnws File (quoting Agriculture Secretary Dan Glickman as "frustrated"
with EC response to Appellate Body's report).
'7 See E. U. Sets New Studies on Beef Hormone Risk, J. COM., Mar. 12, 1998, at 4A.
' See EC Measures Concerning Meat and Meat Products (Hormones), Arbitration under Article 21.3(c) of
the Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement of Disputes, WTO Doc. WT/DS26/
15 & WT/DS48/13, paras. 39-42 (May 29, 1998) (http://www.wto.org/wto/dispute/distab.htm).
* The author is Visiting Professor of Law at Boston College Law School during the academic year
1998-1999.
19981
